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Abstract 
The use of natural resources comes with dramatic responsibilities for producers and resource 
owners. According to Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resources Development mining 
companies must plan for suspension, abandonment, remediation and surface reclamation of the 
territory they utilise. These companies, also known as Approval Holders, have choices as to which 
security types to use in order to satisfy their environmental liabilities. These choices have material 
impact in determining annual royalty and tax revenues collected by the government. 
Royalty regulation in Alberta allows Approval Holders to deduct their annual costs from 
revenues. QETs (Qualifying Environmental Trusts), unlike Letters of Credit, are allowed for such 
deductions. As a result, when used by Approval Holders QETs shrink the royalty revenue materially, 
since its full value is tax and royalty deductible. However, Approval Holders cannot deduct QETs 
from taxable income if the mine field is no longer recoverable and the production of bitumen has 
stopped permanently. As time horizon of existing mine fields in Oil Sands shrinks and future 
commodity prices stay uncertain we expect that Approval Holders will make a quick use of QETs to 
reduce their taxable income in the near future. In this paper, we explain why oil sands operators have 
not used QETs as financial securities and which uncertainties should play critical roles in identifying 
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negative revenue impacts. This report gives an analysis of such differences and suggests possible 
ways to avoid royalty revenue reductions from Oil Sands mine fields. 
Key words: the economics of financial security, qualifying environmental trust, letters of 
credit, royalty revenue, west texas intermediate. 
JEL Classification codes: Q51, Q52, B41 
1. General summary 
1.1.The Financial Regulation of Mining Operations in Alberta 
In Alberta, unlike in many other jurisdictions around the globe, the calculation of security 
deposits to enable future reclamation of mining area is made by the operators themselves. Since 
it is more logical that an operator would make its best estimate to commit for a successful 
reclamation of its used site the legislation in Alberta supports the reclamation calculations to be 
made by operators. This approach also helps to ease the sustainable development of the Oil 
Sands mineable areas by creating a clear yet favourable regulatory environment for national and 
international operators without compromising the environmental challenges left to the 
government by the industry. Until the September of 1993 security deposits under previous 
legislation were calculated on an acre basis. With the new regulation of reclamation estimation at 
full cost the previous per acre rate ($250 per acre) of calculation was grandfathered.  
The Mine Financial Security Program, as stated in the MFSP Guide 2011 of Alberta 
Environment, is a comprehensive program which manages all qualitative and quantitative aspects 
of coal, sand and gravel and oil sands mine operations which includes: 
 Quantification of liabilities incurred for mine operations and potential assets matching 
offsetting these liabilities 
 Regular and appropriate documentation and reporting of information for total liabilities arising and  
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 A requirement to report ongoing reclamation activities during but not after a production period. 
This paper focuses on the economics of instruments used in the Oil Sands mining operations.  
The Mine Financial Security Program takes an asset-to-liability approach in securing total 
expected reclamation liabilities. Companies must remit a base amount of security and, if needed, 
an additional financial security to meet their liabilities for reclamation purposes. 
A general rule says that if an approval holder has: 
1) MFSP assets at least three times larger than its MFSP liability, is 
2) within 15 years from the end of its bitumen or coal reserves and is  
3) keeping up-to-date with its reclamation schedule  
Then, additional security above the base security is not required. If at least one of the three 
requirements above is not met, then additional financial security is required to satisfy total 
reclamation liability.  
1.2. Types of Financial Security Deposits 
Four types of financial security deposits have been adopted under MFSP. 
Base Security Deposit (BSD) 
BSD is paid to the government. The applicant becomes immediately liable whenever it is 
granted with the Approval to mine in the field. The base security deposit is $30 million for a new 
oil sands mine with no upgrader and $60 million with an upgrader: 
Table 1.  Base Security Deposit requirement with/without an upgrader 
A new oil sands mine with no upgrader $ 30,000,000 
A new oil sands mine with an upgrader $ 60,000,000 
Source: imputed calculation by author and approved by Alberta Environment 2013 
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Operating Life Deposit (OLD) 
OLD mitigates risks as mine reserves matures. The OLD is normally a difference in 
reclamation liabilities above BSD. 
The Approval Holder must start paying financial security for reclamation purposes when 
there is less than or equal to fifteen years of reserves left. The deadline for fully funded security 
is when a mine facility has six years of reserve life left. The financial security posting 
requirements due to reserve years left is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
   
 
 
Source: MFSP Assets/Liabilities, Alberta Environment 
The OLD amount is normally calculated as the difference between the actual reclamation 
liabilities incurred to date minus the BSD paid at inception (Reclamation Liability incurred up to date 
– BSD = OLD. This function is derived based on the MFSP Guide of Alberta Environment 2011.). 
Asset Safety Factor Deposit (ASFD) 
According to the MFSP guide an MFSP Asset to MFSP Liability ratio of 3.00 (three) must 
be maintained during the life of the mining production. The Approval Holder is required to bring 
the MFSP Asset/MFSP Liability ratio to 3.00 whenever the rate falls below 3.00. For this 
purpose, the Approval Holder posts additional financial security. 
Figure 1. Time Related Posting Requirements for Financial Securities 
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Outstanding Reclamation Deposit (ORD) 
The requirement for ORD is solely due to any risks that potentially defer the reclamation. 
The Approval Holder pays additional financial security to reduce its liability to meet 
reclamation.  
1.3. Approval Holder’s responsibility, MFSP Assets and MFSP Liabilities 
Approval Holder’s responsibility when the ownership is less than 100% 
Under the MFSP Guide the EPEA Approval Holder is always responsible for the 100% of 
the MFSP assets and liabilities. In case of joint ventures, variable interest entities or participants, 
companies may choose to provide their own share of the required financial security. It is because 
the Approval Holder in reality may or may not have a 100% ownership of the mining facility. 
However, as it is stated in the MFSP Guide 2011 of Alberta Environment, sharing the financial 
security payable is a business arrangement but not the requirement of the MFSP. Thus, an 
Approval Holder is always responsible to arrange timely estimation, measurement and provision 
of financial securities to the fund. 
As of 2011 Syncrude Canada Ltd has a total MFSP security of $ 205,303,024 (This 
information is based on the Ministry of Environment 2011 Canada and on OSRIN paper by R. 
Dixon, M. Maier, A. Sandilya and T. Schneider: “Qualifying Environmental Trusts as Financial 
Security for Oil Sands Reclamation Liabilities). This was a sum of security amounts provided as joint 
venture contributions. The partners of Syncrude Canada Ltd are Imperial Oil Limited, Suncor Energy 
Inc., Canadian Oil Sands Ltd., Nexen Oil Sands, Alberta Ltd., Murphy Oil Company Ltd., and Mocal 
Energy Ltd.  
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MFSP Assets 
MFSP Assets represent the financial capability of a mine project which is operated by an 
Approval Holder. Satisfying the Asset Safety Factor Deposit calculation, MFSP Assets of a mine 
project must always be at list three times bigger than MFSP Liabilities of the same project. Note, 
MFSP Assets and MFSP Liabilities point to a current mine project and not to corporate-wide 
assets. 
MFSP Assets (MFSP Asset Calculation, Description, page 13 Alberta Environment MFSP 
Guide 2011) are calculated by multiplying the project’s gross proven and probable reserves by 
the three year average netback. The result is then multiplied by a forward price factor also known 
as projected future commodity price. The Formula given below describes the calculation. 
 
 
Where, 
 Netback means gross profit and represents a 3 year average of annual netbacks.  
 
 R = Gross proven and probable reserves. Total dollar values of reserves are calculated 
based on current product price being sold. If the product being sold is bitumen the dollar value is 
per unit of bitumen. If the product being sold is synthetic crude then the dollar value is per unit 
of bitumen. Note that approved mine areas that are excluded from mining in either the ERCB or 
EPEA approval must not be included in estimating the reserves.  
 F = Forward Price Factor. In Oil Sands a forward price factor is the lesser of  
- 1.00 or 
Formula 1. MFSP Assets calculation 
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- 
 
Future price increases are not added in determining the factor due to conservatism principle 
required by statements of financial accounting concepts. 
MFSP Liabilities 
Reclamation liabilities, just as MFSP Assets, must be measured to determine an MFSP 
Assets to MFSP Liabilities ratio of three in Assets Safety Factor deposits calculation. It is 
important to note that MFSP Liability (MFSP Liability Calculation, Page 20, Alberta 
Environment MFSP Guide 2011) amounts should be derived from each Approval Holder’s 
publicly filed and audited annual financial statements or other supporting working papers. The 
MFSP Liability calculations include all costs of suspension, abandonment, remediation and 
surface reclamation of the site assuming the mining operation will run steadily as planned.  
 
 
Where, 
  Asset Retirement Obligation is an undiscounted (When discounted a nominal dollar 
amount stated at a future time becomes a smaller amount in current period. Because current 
balance sheet includes an undiscounted future dollar amount today, it is acceptable to keep this 
undiscounted obligation as it is in current balance sheets.) sum of suspension, abandonment, 
remediation, and reclamation costs of the MFSP site. Since the sum of these costs is not 
discounted, their actual present value today is lower than ARO number in the Balance Sheet. 
MFSP Liability estimates and calculations include all the possible costs to reclaim the site. It is 
assumed that reclamation operations are carried out during and after the mine ceases to operate.  
 Continuous reclamation process is important in obtaining a final reclamation certificate 
(The MFSP Liability calculations represent the third party costs to suspend, abandon, remediate 
and surface reclaim the site based on the assumption the operation will continue to run in normal 
Formula 2. MFSP Liability calculation 
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fashion until the final reclamation certificate is received). In 2011, Canada has adopted new 
accounting standards under IFRS to account for liability provisions. Stemming from new adoption 
the Other Liability provision encapsulates any inconsistencies between the two standards. 
Table 2. Differences between financial security deposits (The table is initially provided at 
page 24 (Alberta Environment MFSP Guide 2011) 
 Base Security 
Deposit - BSD 
Asset Safety 
Factor Deposit – 
ASFD 
Operating Life Deposit - 
OLD 
Outstanding 
Reclamation 
Deposit – ORD 
Risk 
addressed 
Approval 
Holder 
unexpectedly 
defaults. 
Approval Holder`s 
MFSP Asset value 
falls below 3 times 
their MFSP 
Liability. 
Approval Holder`s resource 
base is nearing the end of its 
life. 
Approval Holder is 
not progressively 
reclaiming land that 
has been scheduled 
for reclamation. 
Main 
Factor 
Complexity of 
the sector 
MFSP Asset, MFSP 
Liability and any 
BSD and OLD 
Reserves and sales rate 
represented by Reserve Life 
Index (RLI) for sites with both 
AENV and ERCB approvals 
Reclamation 
performance based on 
Current Mine 
Reclamation Plan 
 Deposit          
calculation  
basis 
On the basis 
of each EPEA 
approval  
On the basis of each 
EPEA approval 
On the basis of each EPEA 
approval 
On the basis of each 
EPEA approval 
Deposit 
payment 
Lump Sum Lump Sum for the 
shortfall 
Phased-in over 10 years, 
adjusted for BSD 
Lump Sum for un-
reclaimed land 
Deposit 
reduced 
when… 
Amount does 
not decrease 
until the MFSP 
Liability falls 
below the BSD 
The Adjusted Asset 
Safety Factor is 
equal to or greater 
than 3.00. This 
factor is calculated 
each year. 
MFSP Liability is reduced OR 
Reserves added to bring the 
reserve life equal to or greater 
than 6.00 (partial recovery) or 
equal to or greater than 15.00 
(full return). 
When the Approval 
Holder reduces the 
Cumulative 
Reclamation Balance. 
Source: Alberta Environment 2011 
As it was initially described in section 1.2 (Types of Financial Security Deposits) requirements for 
additional security deposits describe certain triggers about the nature of such payments: 
Base Security Deposit (BSD) 
Oil sands mines are required to provide a Base Security Deposit in accordance with the 
following table: 
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Table 3.  BSD held by Alberta Environment, as of December 31, 2010 
Approval Holder/Project Name/EPEA Approval Number Base Security Deposit 
Canadian Natural, Horizon, 149968 $ 61,200,000.00 
Imperial, Kearl, 46586 $ 64,655,000.00 
Shell Albian, Jackpine, 153125 $72,361,895.00 
Shell Albian, Muskeg River, 20809 $111,277,441.29 
Suncor, Base Mine, 94 $359,096,654.00 
Suncor, Fort Hills, 151469 $38,958,605.00 
Syncrude, Mildred Lake and Aurora North, 26 $205,303,024.00 
Total $912,852,619.29 
Source: Alberta Environment 2011 
Asset Safety Factor Deposit (ASFD) 
The table below provides an example for Asset Safety Factor calculation. 
Table 4. Assets Safety Factor Deposit 
MFSP Assets MFSP 
Liability-
OLD-BSD 
AASF Asset Safety 
Factor Deposit 
(ASFD) 
Liability net of 
Deposits  
Resultant ASF
$ 61,000,000 $20,000,000 3.05 $0 $20,000,000 3.05 
$57,500,000 $20,000,000 2.88 $833,333 $19,166,667 3.00 
$54,000,000 $20,000,000 2.70 $2,000,000 $18,000,000 3.00 
$50,500,000 $20,000,000 2.53 $3,166,667 $16,833,333 3.00 
Source: Alberta Environment 2011 
Sample calculation for the second raw from Table 4 where MFSP Assets are equal to $ 
57,500,000 
1. MFSP Liability-OLD-BSD = Liability Net of Deposits = $20,000,000 
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2. Resultant Asset Safety Factor = MFSP Assets/Liability Net of Deposits = 
$57,500,000/$20,000,000 = 2.88 
3. Asset Safety Factor Deposit = MFSP Liability – OLD – BSD – (MFSP Assets/3) = 
$20,000,000 - $57,500,000/3 = $19,166,667 
Operating Life Deposit (OLD) 
As noted in section 1.2 (Types of Financial Security Deposits) Operating Life Deposit is 
required as Approval Holder’s reserves have less than 15 years of lifetime. 
Calculation for OLD begins when the Reserve Life Index (RLI) becomes lower than 15 
years: 
0% of the MFSP Liability when RLI >= 15.00 
10% of the MFSP Liability when RLI < 15.00 
20% of the MFSP Liability when RLI < 14.00 
30% of the MFSP Liability when RLI < 13.00 
The calculation reaches a 100% of the MFSP Liability when reserve life becomes less than 
six years (The calculation for Operating Life Deposit is based on Alberta Environment MFSP 
Guide 2011). 
1.4. Current Status of Reclamation Activities in Alberta Oil Sands 
Generally, mine land areas can either be temporarily or permanently reclaimed. Alberta 
Environment provides that official trend for disturbed land has increased between 2009 and 2011. 
The figure below describes the cumulative area for oil sands mining and reclamation activities during 
2009-2011. We could see that areas ready for reclamation have decreased from 2009 to 2011. This is 
because these lands are being either actively used or reclaimed. The fact that temporary reclamation 
activities have broadened may explain the decrease of areas ready for reclamation.  
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As the figure provides below, the disturbed areas of land have been increasing for the last 
three years.  
Today, Canada exports more than two million barrels of oil to US and other international 
markets. It is forecasted that export potential will even double before 2021. Such an extensive 
increase in crude export cannot be pictured without bigger disturbed land areas. MFSP Liabilities 
of Approval Holders will also extend with the increased number of land disturbances that will cost 
billions of dollars per reclamation area. It is expected that operators will continue using financial 
securities to keep their asset to liability balances on accepted levels for the Director of Alberta 
Environment and Sustainable Resource Development. 
We assume that the dollar amounts of financial securities will grow such hat any Approval Holders 
will change forms of reclamation securities available to them. Due to differences in tax and royalty 
revenue treatments of reclamation securities a change from one type of security to another will 
Figure 2. Areal breakdown of Oil Sands Mining and Reclamation 
 
Source: Provided by Alberta Environment 
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create substantial fluctuations in royalty revenues. For example: Qualifying Environmental Trusts 
are deductible for both, tax and accounting purposes. When QETs are used by Approval Holders 
they deduct their QET amounts as allowed costs the end result of which is reduced royalty 
payments. Whereas, Letters of Credit are not tax deductible which means there is no disadvantage 
for the government when LOCs are used by Approval Holders. However, companies have choice 
as to which security to use. By exercising it they can plan their costs and have impact on annual 
budget commitments of the government. The paper discusses these nuances in detail in section 3.2. 
A breakdown by operators in Oil Sands mine areas is provided in Figure3. As depicted in 
Figure3, Suncor and Syncrude has put in place a huge reclamation work. Let us note that 
reclamation certificate is not granted to Approval Holders immediately. Certain period must pass 
before a reclamation certificate is finally granted. Syncrude Canada has been issued a 
reclamation certificate for 104 hectares of reclaimed land. Such practice is ongoing and will 
continue in the future too. However, there are huge areas that are disturbed at present and will 
need to be reclaimed and returned to the province.  
At present, reclamation technology is inefficient and costly to operators. It is mainly 
mechanical and some chemical processes that requires strict commitments from Approval 
Holders. For example, it takes around 20-30 years to place soils, neutralize sulfur content and re-
vegetate the mine area as per approved plans. Despite all these difficulties extensive research and 
development activity is taking place for mine reclaimable sites. Newly created corporative 
efforts are aimed at addressing these issues. Canadian Oil Sands Network for Research and 
Development (CONRAD) and Cumulative Environmental Management Association (CEMA) 
are good examples. CEMA defines criteria for Approval Holders to meet the reclamation 
requirement set by the government. Although efforts to create new reclamation techniques are 
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continuously studied, the financial security cost of MFSP Liabilities are not expected to decrease 
in value. Hence, financial securities amount to billions of dollars in the near future. 
Figure 3.Reclamation and Disturbance by Companies, December 31, 2011 
 
Source: Provided by Alberta Environment 
2. Financial securities 
          2.1. Financial Security Calculation Period 
According to Alberta Environment MFSP Guide security is calculated annually. If current 
MFSP Assets are lower than previous MFSP Assets or current MFSP Liabilities are higher than 
previous year MFSP Liabilities then security required will increase in the current period. In other 
words, required financial security will increase because less reclamation has been done than the 
Planned Reclamation. If current MFSP Assets are higher than previous MFSP Assets or current 
MFSP Liabilities are lower than previous MFSP Liabilities then less security will be provided in 
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the current year. This may be a result of more reclamation work done than Planned Reclamation 
for the current year. Total amount of financial security is usually the sum of four deposits: BSD 
+ OLD + ASFD + ORD. An exception occurs when the sum of four deposits exceeds the MFSP 
Liability amount where the deposit balance is reduced to MFSP Liability amount. 
As noted above in MFSP Liabilities section, Approval Holders must provide financial 
securities based on two deposit types: Base Security Deposit and Operating Life Deposit. 
With base security the amount is $30 million for an oil sands mine. If an upgrader exists on 
the site then the base security is equal to $60 million as shown in table 3. Later, as an oil sands 
mine reaches its reserve life left by 15 years the Approval Holder must set aside an additional 
10% security per year. This is process of security buildup is shown under Operating Life Deposit 
sub-heading at the end of the previous page. With less than six years left before the end of the 
mine life a full amount of financial security is posted.  
         2.2. Types of Financial Securities 
Forms of financial securities for MFSP can include(Forms of financial securities 
mentioned in the paper is based on Section 21 of the Conservation and Reclamation Regulation) 
cash, cheques to the Minister of Finance, debentures, government backed bonds, irrevocable 
letters of guarantee, credit, performance bonds, term deposits, investment certificates and 
qualifying environmental trusts. Any form of security must be accepted and approved by the 
Director of Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development.  
The most common type is known as Letter of Credit and is broadly used to offset required 
MFSP Liabilities. The other form of security is called Qualifying Environmental Trusts (QET). 
QET are more complex in that their accounting and tax treatment entirely differs from that of 
LOC. For example: an entire amount of QET security is deductible for both financial accounting 
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and tax purposes in the year of occurrence and there for affects total royalty revenue of the 
government for that same year. Whereas, with LOC security, only a transaction cost of the 
security is deducted as a current year expense which has immaterial impact on current year 
royalty revenues of the government. No matter which form of security is chosen an Approval 
Holder is required to disclose its financial securities in their entirety. The paper gives a detailed 
analysis of such differences and derives possible ways and motives of royalty revenue 
disruptions later in this section (Financial Securities).  
Letter of Credits (LOC) 
The majority of all securities in oil sands are provided through irrevocable letters of credit. 
LOCs are financial instruments that allow the Director to collect cash from the bank writing the 
instrument in case if the Approval Holder fails to meet its reclamation deadlines. There are 
advantages and disadvantages of LOC for Approval Holders.  
Table 5 Advantages and Disadvantages LOCs provided by Approval Holders. 
Advantages to Approval Holders Disadvantages to Approval Holders 
Inexpensive: – It costs a few percent of the full 
amount stated in LOCs to create the financial 
instrument. 
Cost of LOC, not the face amount of LOC is tax 
and royalty deductible. Thus, more taxes paid 
every year by Approval Holders. 
Source: imputed calculation by author and approved by Alberta Environment 2013 
As we could see from Table 5 letters of credit simply cost less to Approval Holders.  
For example:  $10 million LOC during Year1 would cost the Approval Holder $200K if 
the bank charges two percent on the face amount of LOC. This is an advantage to the Approval 
Holder. Because, it is not required to physically set aside an entire ($10 million) amount for the 
LOC. Thus, only $200K is paid to the bank to create the instrument.  
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On the other hand, when looked at the tax and royalty calculations we could see the 
disadvantage to the Approval Holder. Approval Holder would be able to deduct only $200K 
from its revenue as security expenses, rather than entire $10 million, during that same year. That 
would leave more revenues for both tax and royalty purposes. In other words, Approval Holder 
would pay more cash for tax and royalty remittances at Year1. 
Qualifying Environmental Trust (QET) 
Qualifying Environmental Trusts are more costly to Approval Holders but leaves 
considerably less royalty and tax collections for the government at any period QETs are used. 
With Qualifying Environmental Trusts the entire amount of the instrument ($10 million) would 
be set aside by Approval Holders. This means Approval Holders must actually set aside the face 
amount stated as QETs. The entire QET amount is deductable for income tax purposes meaning 
the entire face amount are deducted from the current year revenue of an Approval Holder thus 
leaving less Profit available for both Tax and Royalty calculation purposes. QETs are discussed 
in further detail in section 3.1 and 3.2. 
3. Impacts of qualifying environmental trusts (QETs) 
         3.1.  Royalty Revenue impact of QETS 
Royalty revenues comprise a great portion of the Alberta Government Revenue. Royalty 
revenues are calculated based on the market price of the product being produced(In accordance 
with Oil Sands Royalty Regulation, 2009 Government of Alberta 2009 the product can be many 
forms of crude: synthetic crude, bitumen, blended bitumen etc. For a complete list refer to this 
source.). IN accordance with the Mine and Minerals Act of the Government of Alberta royalty is 
paid after a difference between revenues and allowed costs. QETs fall into the category where 
Approval Holders can deduct the full face amount of QETs as allowed costs to determine the 
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royalty revenue for the government. Unlike LOC where the establishment cost deductible for 
income tax purposes is 1%-2% of the face amount, QETs are fully deductible meaning it results 
in huge amount royalty reduction as a bottom line.  
The advantage of full QET deduction from revenues as an allowed cost is enabled by the 
Income Tax Act of the Government of Canada. QETs are created as a response to an unfair tax 
positions faced by medium-to-small size mining companies. Before QETs, all the mining 
companies were not allowed to deduct the full amount of their reclamation securities set aside for 
reclamation purposes. As a result, these smaller companies had to pay materially higher tax 
money. The importance of establishing QETs is that it creates a choice for Approval Holders 
from the tax point of view. With the establishment of the QET, Approval holders can choose to 
either pay more tax and royalty revenues by using LOC as an instrument or they may want to use 
QET to considerably reduce their tax and royalty payments for a single fiscal period. 
In addition, during the periods with rising commodity prices the government may choose 
to review its royalty policy and excessively charge the Approval Holders on top of current 
economic rent. In response to such potential reviews by government the Approval Holders may 
contribute to QETs during the same fiscal year by decreasing their taxable income for that 
period. Moreover, companies can withdraw from QETs when royalty rates become lower as a 
result of decreasing market prices. 
With this choice in mind we assume that companies would prefer QETs to LOC towards 
the end of their reserve life. The assumption of increasing importance on QETs instruments 
demonstrates once more that the Government of Alberta should take a thorough look at royalty 
sensitive parts of its provincial budget.  
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3.2. Uncertainties and limitations on Approval Holders`  use of QETs 
Although it seems that Approval Holders can impose as much QET as possible for their tax 
purposes Alberta Environment would presumably limit voluntary QETs. Thus, voluntary 
contributions, unlike mandatory QETs, would not qualify for tax deductions. This would have a 
positive impact on the total amount of royalty collection. Another uncertainty would be a 
hypothetical situation where the bitumen production ends whereas the Approval Holder has 
substantial amounts of QET funded. Any subsequent withdrawal of QETs after the depletion of 
mine reserves are not depicted anywhere in the current tax regulation.  
Why Approval Holders would use QETs during periods with high oil prices? 
The paper assumes that Approval Holders would use QETs to deduct costs and reduce 
royalty revenues during prevailing crude prices. This is because royalty revenues increase as 
WTI crude price goes up and Approval Holders would be willing to offset this increase by 
reducing their taxable income together with their net royalty revenue. The paper has chosen the 
year of 2011 to calculate royalty revenues for post payout projects of Alberta Energy in 2011: 
The Crown`s royalty share of an oil sands product during a period is the greater of the 
Gross Royalty Rate and the Net Royalty Rate (See Alberta Oil Sands Royalty Guidelines, 
Principles and Procedures (October 11, 2012). Three separate formulas exist for different price 
relationships for both Net and Gross methods of royalty calculation. For a Low<WTI<High 
relationship we must use the formulas as they are given in the section above.). 
Formula 3. Gross Royalty Rate 
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Formula 4. Net Royalty Rate 
 
 
Table6.  2011 annual WTI price calculation 
DATE WTI (USD) Month Average 
USD/CAD 
Exchange Rate 
WTI (CAD)Month 
Average 
WTI (CAD) 
Annual 
January 95.74 0.965 99.15  
February 97.41 0.988 98.59  
March 102.86 0.991 103.75  
April 106.98 0.996 107.37  
May 100.47 1.000 100.42  
June 96.81 1.003 96.44  
July 96.84 1.009 95.97  
August 94.20 1.025 91.84  
September 92.25 1.023 90.14  
October 94.01 1.019 92.20  
November 94.34 1.013 93.06  
December 94.34 1.011 93.28  
ANNUAL    96.85 
Source: imputed calculation by author and approved by Alberta Environment 2013 
During 2011 the average WTI price of crude was calculated to be CAD 96.85 which falls 
between low and high ends. Low and high ends are determined by Alberta Energy to be $55, 
$120 respectively. All the data was collected from oil sands monthly royalty rates of Alberta 
Energy. The average annual price is then calculated as a mathematical average of twelve 
monthly rates for WTI in Canadian dollars. 
Having calculated the annual WTI price as CAD 96.85 the paper further adapts the Oil 
Sands –post payout projects of Alberta Energy as of Year 2011. The purpose is to compare our 
independent royalty revenue calculation with the royalty revenue number given by Alberta 
Energy and then assess a possible decrease in royalty revenue if a QET was introduced. 
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Table7. Oil Sands – Post Payout Projects 2011 
Sales Revenue $ 34,623,100,000 
Operating Costs $ 11,337,969,000 
Diluent Costs $ 5,933,445,000 
Capital Costs $ 6,176,089,000 
Other Allowed Costs $ 0 
Net Revenue $ 11,175,597,000 
Number of Projects as of 2011 57 
Royalty (as stated by Alberta Energy) $3,793,860,000 
The production includes bitumen, blend, SCO, WCS and other volumes. 
Now, let us calculate royalty revenue independently: 
 
Now, let us multiply the gross rate to the gross revenue which is provided in Table7: 
Gross Method Royalty = $ 34,623,100,000*6.2% = $ 2,146,632,200. 
25%+(96.
85-55)*(15%/65)*11,175,597,000/34,623,100,000 = 28% 
Now, let us multiply the net royalty rate to the net revenue which is provided in Table7. 
Net Method Royalty = 28%*$ 11,175,597,000 = $ 3,129,167,160. 
Since the greater of the two is considered as royalty revenue we can choose Net Method 
Royalty amount of $ 3,129,167,160.This is a little different than the number stated by Alberta 
Energy. The difference is due to return allowances, other net proceeds and tax differences. For 
simplicity these differences have not been included in calculations. 
If total royalty revenues earned by the government of Alberta in 2011 on post payout 
projects were divided to the number of active projects in 2011 ($3,793,860,000/57) we could get 
a royalty revenue per project of $ 66 million. Considering an average mine field with a minimum 
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facility to have a market value of $ 100 million, it would not be hard to find a 15% tax deduction 
for any QET amount. If 100% funded by QET, the 15% tax deduction on a $100 million project 
would equal to $15 million, making 22% of $66 million royalty revenue assumed above on 
average. A 22% hypothetical change in royalty revenue could have a substantial impact on 
budgeting decisions during any period QETs funded. 
Use of QETs during times with high risen crude prices would not have a sensitive impact on 
government`s budget planning. This is because increased crude prices would offset tax gains of the 
Approval Holders. However, it would be beneficial if the government ruled out a new law against the 
use of QETs during low crude prices. If we consider the fact that Supported Infrastructure 
Organizations in Alberta (SIOs) are funded by the provincial budget then the importance of putting 
limitation on QETs during times with low oil prices would avoid possible financial distress. 
3.3. Tax impact of QETS 
Generally, amounts paid and accrued for reclamation obligations before actual reclamation 
expenditures incurred are not tax deductible for income tax purposes. Although statutory 
regulations puts constraints on tax deductibility of the allowed costs for tax purposes it is 
allowed to deduct both, current and estimated future reclamations costs for financial reporting 
purposes under current financial reporting standards. To offset this mismatch, qualifying 
environmental trusts paid by taxpayers are allowed as tax deductible. Moreover, the QET given 
to the trust can earn income during a year. Such income made on QET is taxed first. However, 
that same after-tax income is taxed for the second time at a corporate tax rate (15% in 2012) in 
the year it is removed from the QET resulting in an element of double taxation. Also, when the 
QET is withdrawn by the Approval Holder the taxable income is increased by the exact QET 
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amount subject to corporate tax rate. In addition to mine operations QET rules of the Income Tax 
Act are also inherent for pipeline abandonment trusts. 
As stated in section 2.1 the Approval Holder calculates its MFSP Asset and Liability 
balance once at the end of each year. If the Approval Holder decides to withdraw all or a portion 
of its QET amount from the trust it is expected that the trustee would return the cash amount to 
the Approval Holder. Such a practice with mine Approval Holders was not observed before. 
4 . Tax and royalty regimes in other jurisdictions 
Royalty Regimes 
Governments have variety of methods to impose royalty on Approval Holders. These can 
be unit based, value based also known as ad valorem, or profit and income based. In Canada, 
most jurisdictions (British Columbia, Northwest Territories) tend to have profit based royalty, 
Saskatchewan having both, profit based and ad valorem(Ad valorem royalty is based on the 
production volume rather than gross profit based.) type royalty regimes. Appendix 1 provides the 
royalty practices, types and rates across other jurisdictions.  
Tax Regimes 
In general, tax regimes are structured progressively. When a project becomes more profitable 
their tax burdens increase too. Canada has a taxation system with a slight increase in tax burdens as 
projects become more profitable due to commodity price increase. Appendix 2 describes increase in 
average effective tax rates with rising internal rate of returns for mining projects. A study conducted 
by Natural Resources Canada suggests that Canada, Chile and United States have more tolerant 
mining taxation regime when Approval Holders project profitability increase. However, all other 
international jurisdictions tend to penalize their mine projects as internal rate of project returns go up. 
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In searching around many jurisdictions it was observed that most governments accept only 
cash, bonds and bank guarantees. Few jurisdictions allow third party trusts as financial security 
for reclamation purposes. Despite all the similarities in tax rates (Appendix 3), tax rules and 
allowances established by various governments around the world, it was found that most 
jurisdictions would not allow for tax deductions on reclamation securities.  
5. Conclusions 
Unlike many other jurisdictions around the globe, Canada’s tolerant tax regime allows the 
companies to keep almost a 100% of marginal increases in their internal rate of returns. 
Moreover, Approval Holders have a free choice to choose QETs at their discretion by avoiding 
regular tax and royalty payments otherwise they would have incurred. The major caveat 
mentioned by this report is the uncertainty of a potential use of QETs and future prices of WTI 
crude. QETs are deductible for both, royalty and tax purposes and we expect Approval Holders 
to take a complete advantage of this financial security created by the Income Tax Act of Canada. 
Although the use of QETs may not have dramatic impact on royalty revenues when crude prices 
are high I believe suggestions should be made to freeze tax and royalty deductibility provisions 
of QETs at times with declined commodity prices. It is suggested that the Government of Alberta 
reach a consensus with Approval Holders by putting certain rules in place including: 
1. Ruling out a new law against the use of QETs during low crude prices. If we consider the 
fact that Supported Infrastructure Organizations in Alberta (SIOs) are funded by the provincial 
budget then the limitation on QETs during down times would avoid any financial stress. 
2. If new ruling does not seem to be realistic, then communicating with Approval Holders and 
operators on their expected choices of security types and factoring those results in to medium term 
budgeting decisions. 
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3. Determine the list of near end of life reserve mines and impose specific limitations on 
the use of QETs for such mine projects. 
As commodity prices fluctuate unstably and current mine reserves become less recoverable 
sharp decreases in royalty reductions may turn out to be unavoidable in near time horizon.  
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7. Glossary of terms and acronyms 
7.1.Terms 
Approval Holder 
An entity that has been granted an Approval for oil sands mining and processing under the 
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act (EPEA) 
Director 
The Director of the Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development designated 
under EPEA who issues approvals for mine or production facility. 
Financial Security 
A reclamation liability security provided by Approval Holders as cash or financial instrument. 
Qualifying Environmental Trust 
As per Income Tax Act (ITA) of Government of Canada 1985, section 28: 
A” qualifying environmental trust” refers to a trust resident in a province and maintained at that 
time for the sole purpose of funding the reclamation of a site in the province that had been used 
primarily for, or for any combination of, the operation of a mine, or the deposit of waste, where 
the maintenance of the trust is or may become required under the terms of a contract entered into 
with Canada or the province. It does not include a trust that relates to the reclamation of a well. 
Upgrader 
An upgrader is a production facility that uses heat and pressure to change the extracted bitumen 
into liquid hydrocarbons and saturates with hydrogen to produce synthetic crude oil. An upgrader 
has by-products during processing.  
7.2.Acronyms 
ASFD   Asset Safety Factor Deposit 
BSD   Base Security Deposit 
CABREE  Centre for Applied Research on Energy and the Environment 
ITA   Income Tax Act of Canada 
ICMM              International Council on Mining and Metals 
LOC   Letter of Credit 
MFSP   Mine Financial Security Program 
OLD   Operating Life Deposit 
ORD   Outstanding Reclamation Deposit 
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QET   Qualifying Environmental Trust 
 
APPENDIX 1: Summary of Royalty Practices 
Selected North American Jurisdictions 
 Arizona 
(US) 
British 
Columbia 
(Canada) 
Michigan 
(US) 
Nevada 
(US) 
Northwest 
(Canada) 
Ontario 
(Canada) 
Saskat 
Chewan  
(Canada) 
Law Provincial Provincial Provincial Provincial Provincial Provincial Provincial 
Royalty 
Type 
Ad 
valorem 
Profit based 
(net revenue) 
and ad 
valorem (net 
proceeds) 
Ad 
valorem 
Profit 
based 
Profit 
based 
Profit based Profit based 
(net revenue) 
and ad 
valorem (net 
proceeds) 
Royalty 
Rate 
At least 
2% 
13% net 
revenue or 
2% net 
proceeds 
2-7% 2-5% 5-14% 10% 5% of net 
profit 
increases to 
10% with 
life time 
thresholds 
Source: adapted from The World Bank – Mining Royalties, a global study of their impact on 
investors, government, and civil society 
 
Selected Latin American Countries 
 Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Dominican 
Republic 
Mexi
co 
Peru 
Law Provincial National National None National None National 
Royalty 
Type 
Ad 
valorem 
Ad 
valorem 
Ad 
valorem 
n.a. Ad valorem, 
creditable against 
income tax 
n.a. Ad valorem, 
based on 
cumulative 
sales 
Royalty 
Rate 
0-3% 1-6%, 
based on 
sales price 
position  
0.2-3% n.a. 5% FOB export n.a. 0-3% 
Source: adapted from The World Bank – Mining Royalties, a global study of their impact on 
investors, government, and civil society 
Selected AustralianJurisdictions 
 New South Wales Northern 
Territory 
Queensland Western Australia 
Law Provincial Provincial Provincial Provincial or 
negotiated agreement 
Royalty 
Type 
Ad valorem, profit 
based in the Broken 
Hill District 
Profit Based (% 
of netback value) 
Ad valorem or 
unit based 
Ad valorem, unit and 
profit based 
Royalty 
Rate 
4-7% 18% 2.7% of value or 
variable royalty rate 
2.5-7.5% ad valorem 
Source: adapted from The World Bank – Mining Royalties, a global study of their impact on 
investors, government, and civil society 
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Appendix 2: Average effective tax rates across a range of profitability 
Sourc
e: adapted from Natural Resources Canada, Information Bulletin, June 2011 
APPENDIX 3: Comparative royalty and tax rates across jurisdictions 
 2003 2003 2012 2012 
Jurisdiction Combined Corporate 
Income Tax Rate 
Mining Royalty 
Rate 
Combined Corporate 
Income Tax Rate 
Mining Royalty 
Rate 
British 
Columbia 
42.62% 13% (profit base) 25% 13% (profit base) 
Manitoba 45.62% 16% (profit base) 27% 10-17% (profit) 
New 
Brunswick 
45.12% 16% (profit base) 25% 16% (profit base) 
Northwest 
Territories 
43.12% 13% (profit base) 26.5% 13% (profit base) 
Nunavut 43.12% 13% (profit base) 27% 13% (profit base) 
Ontario 40.12% 12% (profit base) 25% 10% (profit base) 
Quebec  38.02% 12% (profit base) 26.9% 16% (profit base) 
Yukon 44.12% 13% (profit base) 30% 12% (profit base) 
Australia 
(South) 
30% 3.5% (ad valorem) 30% (29% from 2013) 3.5% (ad valorem) 
Australia 
(West) 
30% 5% (ad valorem) 30% (29% from 
2013) 
5% (ad valorem) 
Chile 16.5% n.a. 20% (17% from 
2013) 
9% (ad valorem varies 
due to gross margin) 
Indonesia 30% 4% (ad valorem) 25% 4% (ad valorem) 
Mexico 34%+10% profit sharing n.a. 34% +10% profit sharing n.a. 
South 
African 
Republic 
30% 2% (ad valorem) 28% 2% (ad valorem) 
USA 
(Alaska) 
44.4% 10% (profit base) 44.4% 10% (profit base) 
USA 
(Nevada) 
35% n.a. 35% n.a. 
Source: adapted from Natural Resources Canada, Information Bulletin, June 2011 
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